We investigate the welfare e¤ects of in ‡ation in economies with search frictions and menu costs. We …rst analyze an economy where there is no transaction demand for money balances: Money is a mere unit of account. We determine a condition under which strictly positive in ‡ation is desirable. We relate this condition to a standard e¢ ciency condition for search economies. Second, we consider a related economy in which there is a transaction role for money. In the absence of menu costs, the Friedman rule is optimal. In the presence of menu costs, the optimal in ‡ation rate is negative for our numerical examples provided menu costs are small. A deviation from the Friedman rule can be optimal depending on the extent of the search externalities.
Introduction
Lagos and Wright (2005) showed that models with explicit microfoundations for monetary exchange can be used for policy analysis and they can generate new useful predictions. While the Lagos-Wright model emphasizes search frictions to explain the usefulness of money, it omits nominal frictions that many think are important to capture the e¤ects of monetary policy. For instance, Diamond (1993, p. 53) argued that "some degree of price stickiness is a necessary part of a realistic transaction technology." This paper brings monetary theory one step closer to policy analysis by introducing menu costs into a continuous time version of the Lagos-Wright model.
Building on the literature pioneered by Wright (1991, 1993) , we adopt a model where agents trade in bilateral meetings and where means of payment are needed to mitigate a double-coincidence-of-wants problem. We also endogenize the frequency of trades through a free-entry condition so that in ‡ation a¤ects both the quantities traded in individual matches (i.e., the intensive margin) and the number of matches (i.e., the extensive margin).
The introduction of nominal rigidities is based on the model of Sheshinki and Weiss (1977).
Sellers who incur a …xed cost to change their prices adjust them only infrequently by following an endogenous (S; s) rule. 1 In order to disentangle di¤erent ine¢ ciencies associated with in ‡ation, and in order to contrast our analysis with previous search models with sticky prices (e.g., Benabou (1988) and Diamond (1993) ), we …rst study a cashless economy where there is no transaction demand for money balances. We are able to derive analytically a condition under which a positive in ‡ation rate is optimal. This condition states that in ‡ation can be good for society when sellers have too much market power, or equivalently, when the congestion imposed by sellers in the goods market is too severe. In the presence of sticky prices, a deviation from price stability mitigates this ine¢ ciency by reducing sellers'incentives to enter the market.
The introduction of a transaction role for money into the previous environment brings two new insights. First, the result obtained in cashless economies according to which de ‡ation is never optimal does not survive the introduction of an in ‡ation tax. In the absence of menu costs, the Friedman rule is optimal, and in the presence of menu costs, provided menu costs are small, the optimal in ‡ation rate is negative. Second, the presence of nominal rigidities matters for the optimality of the Friedman rule. Depending on the extent of the search externalities and sellers'market power, it is sometimes optimal to keep in ‡ation above the level prescribed by the Friedman rule. 2 Also, we illustrate how the presence of nominal frictions can enhance welfare and how it eliminates a real indeterminacy at the Friedman rule.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the environment. Section 3 solves a model in which there is no money but prices are posted in terms of a unit of account. Section 4 investigates a monetary model with ‡exible prices, and then with sticky prices. All proofs of lemmas and propositions are relegated to the appendix.
The environment
Time is continuous and goes on forever. Some trades take place in a centralized market, and others in a decentralized market with bilateral random matching. There are two types of perishable goods, a special good and a general good. Whereas the general good is produced and traded in the centralized market, the special good is traded in the decentralized market. 3 The economy is populated with a continuum of in…nitely-lived agents divided into two categories, called buyers and sellers to re ‡ect their trading behaviors in the decentralized market.
The measure of buyers is normalized to one. The measure of sellers, denoted n, will be endogenous. Buyers di¤er from sellers both in the goods they produce and in their consumption 2 These results are not inconsistent with …ndings in new Keynesian models based on monopolistic competition and time-dependent pricing. In those models, the Friedman rule is optimal if prices are ‡exible despite the presence of imperfect competition. With sticky prices, de ‡ation is still optimal but the de ‡ation rate can be lower than the one at the Friedman rule. For details and references, see Khan, King, and Wolman (2002) . 3 The assumption that trades take place in both centralized and decentralized markets was introduced by Lagos and Wright (2005) . The environment described in this paper is closer to Rocheteau and Wright (2005) .
preferences. Whereas both types of agents consume and produce the general good, buyers, unlike sellers, also want to consume the special good, and sellers, unlike buyers, produce the special good.
Buyers Sellers
General good consume produce consume produce Special good consume produce
Agents'trading behaviors
The utility of consuming q units of the special good is u 0 q with u 0 > 0. 4 The disutility of producing the special good is c(q) with c(0) = c 0 (0) = 0, c 0 (q) > 0 and c 00 (q) > 0 for q > 0, and c(q) = u 0 q for some q > 0. The instantaneous utility function of buyers and sellers in the centralized market is simply x, where x is the net consumption ‡ow of general goods. 5 Given this speci…cation, producing the general good for oneself is worthless. Buyers and sellers discount future utility at the same rate, > 0.
Unmatched agents trade in the centralized market. They are thrown into a bilateral match,
i.e., in the decentralized market, according to a stochastic Poisson process. When matched, agents do not have access to the centralized market. 6 Matched agents choose whether or not to trade, split apart immediately after the trade has occurred, and return to the centralized market.
Since an agent does not have the ability to produce general goods while in the decentralized market, he can only transfer the special good he produces or the assets he holds at the time he is matched. 7 We will consider two polar cases regarding agents' abilities to use credit. We will …rst 4 The linearity of the utility function in terms of special goods, also used by Benabou (1988) , will simplify greatly sellers' pricing strategy. We will argue, however, that our main results should be robust to alternative speci…cations. 5 The linear speci…cation for the utility functions for centralized market goods is a key assumption to obtain a tractable model in which the distribution of money holdings is easy to handle. See Lagos and Wright (2005) . 6 For a somewhat related formalization where centralized and decentralized markets open concurrently, see Williamson (2006) . 7 One could assume instead that even though general goods can be produced in bilateral matches, the seller does not wish to consume the general good produced by the buyer in the match.
consider an economy in which buyers are able to commit to repay their debts and therefore can use IOUs to trade in the decentralized market. We will call this economy a cashless economy. 8 We will then consider a monetary economy where buyers are unable to commit to repay their debt and need to use money in order to trade in the decentralized market.
The trading opportunities in the decentralized market are described by a standard randommatching technology. The instantaneous matching probability of a buyer is (n), whereas the instantaneous matching probability of a seller is (n)=n. Furthermore, 0 > 0 and 00 < 0, (0) = 0, 0 (0) = 1, 0 (1) = 0 and lim n!1 (n) = 1. We denote (n) = 0 (n)n= (n) the elasticity of the matching function. As we also want to endogenize n, we assume that sellers who participate in the decentralized market incur a ‡ow cost, k > 0, to search for buyers and to advertise their products. 9 There exists a good called money that is intrinsically useless but that serves as a unit of account. The monetary price of the general good is w(t). It will be exogenous in the cashless economy, and will be determined by a market-clearing condition in the monetary economy. In the decentralized market, we adopt the following pricing protocol. Unmatched sellers post a monetary price. They can change their posted prices at any time at the cost in terms of utility. When a match occurs, the transaction price is chosen as follows. With probability
1
, every unit that is produced is sold at the seller's posted price. The quantity traded is the minimum of the buyer's demand and the seller's supply at this price. With probability 2 (0; 1), however, the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er. If this o¤er is rejected by the seller, no trade takes place. One can think of this pricing procedure as bargaining with nominal rigidities, or price posting with imperfect commitment. 10 This pricing captures the observation that transaction prices often di¤er from posted prices. There are two additional reasons to give 8 Related cashless economies with state-dependent pricing are studied in Caplin and Spulber (1987) , Benabou (1988 Benabou ( , 1992 , Diamond (1993) , Golosov and Lucas (2003) , among others. 9 The assumption of free-entry is standard in the search literature to endogenize the number of trades. See, among others, Pissarides (2000) , Diamond (1993) and Rocheteau and Wright (2005) .
1 0 For instance, a seller instructs a sales clerk to sell his output at the posted price. The commitment technology is imperfect in the sense that the sales clerk is not always in the shop, let's say, because it is too costly to have an employee full time. This is related to the assumption of costly price commitment introduced by Bester (1994) . buyers some market power by allowing them to make o¤ers in some matches. First, without this assumption there would be no monetary equilibrium in the economy with ‡exible prices. 11 Second, this assumption will allow us to derive a simple condition on and (n) under which a deviation from price stability is optimal in the cashless economy.
Cashless economies
In this section, we describe an economy in which there are no monetary frictions and agents do not hold nominal assets. As emphasized earlier, this environment is closely related to the one in Diamond (1993) and it will provide a useful benchmark to compare against our monetary economy in Section 4. 12 Also, we will derive several analytical results that will prove useful to build our intuition on the e¤ects of in ‡ation in the presence of nominal and search frictions.
Buyers use credit arrangements to trade in the decentralized market. They commit to repay their debt in the general goods market straight after a trade has occurred. 13 Sellers post a monetary price at which they commit to sell their output. The monetary price of general goods, w(t), is exogenous and is growing at rate . In the following, we will refer to the real price p as the nominal price posted by sellers divided by the price of general goods, w.
Note that p decreases at rate as long as the monetary price remains unchanged.
Consider a buyer. The Poisson arrival rate of a match in the decentralized market is (n).
With probability , the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er (q b ; d b ), where q b is the quantity of the special good produced by the seller, and d b is the quantity of general goods that the buyer 1 1 In order to allow for the existence of a monetary equilibrium in an economy with price posting, one can introduce heterogeneity across buyers. See Curtis and Wright (2004) and Ennis (2004) . One can interpret our assumption that buyers get the whole surplus of the match with probability as a reduced-form for this heterogeneity. 1 2 Our model di¤ers from Diamond (1993) in several dimensions. First, buyers can appropriate the surplus of a match in a fraction of the meetings, whereas in Diamond's model, is assumed to be 0. Second, the quantity traded in each match is endogenous, whereas in Diamond, it is set exogenously at 1. Third, buyers can trade repeatedly in the search market whereas buyers only trade once in Diamond's environment. As we will show, the last two assumptions are not crucial to Diamond's results while the …rst one -the fact that sellers have all the market power -is. 1 3 Diamond (1993, p.56) assumes that the purchasing power held by customers while searching is earning the nominal interest rate which increases point for point with the in ‡ation rate. He argues that "this assumption …ts with payments by check or credit card rather than currency". commits to deliver (the subscript b re ‡ects the assumption that the o¤er is made by a buyer).
With probability 1 , the buyer trades at the posted price: He consumes q s in exchange for d s = pq s units of general goods. The quantity q s , which is the minimum of the buyer's demand and the seller's supply at the posted price, is a function of p. The value function of a buyer, W b , satis…es the following ‡ow Bellman equation
where H(p) is the distribution of real prices across sellers. 
where G(p), the seller's expected trade surplus, satis…es
Equation (2) has the following interpretation. The seller incurs the cost k to participate in the market. A match occurs with instantaneous probability (n)=n, in which case the seller's expected surplus is G(p). The last term on the right-hand side of (2) 
According to (5) , the expected discounted utility of a seller over the (S; s) cycle has to be equal to the cost of setting a new price.
Equilibrium
To characterize equilibrium, we need to specify how terms of trade are formed in the decentralized market. Consider a match between a buyer and a seller whose posted price is p. As previously stated, the transaction price di¤ers from the posted price with probability . In this case, the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er (q b ; d b ) in order to maximize his utility With probability 1 , agents trade at the posted price. However, the seller can choose not to serve all the buyer's demand at that price. The buyer's demand corresponds to the value of q that maximizes his surplus u 0 q pq. It is unbounded if u 0 > p and it is 0 if u 0 < p. 14 We call u 0 the buyer's reservation price. Also, sellers produce no more than the quantity q that maximizes qp c(q). Therefore, q s (p) is given by
It should be noticed here that the assumption of divisible output which will play an important role in the monetary economies is not crucial for the results of the cashless economies.
The optimal pricing policy of sellers is such that S and maximize sellers'expected utility as given by the left-hand side of (5). It is characterized in the following Lemma. 1 4 In the knife-edge case, where u 0 = p, the buyer is indi¤erent between trading or not. To guarantee that the seller's pricing problem has a solution, we assume that the buyer's demand is at least equal to the quantity q that the seller is willing to produce at this price.
Lemma 1 (i) If = 0 then sellers set a real price equal to u 0 . (ii) Assume > 0. The sellers' optimal pricing policy (S, ) satis…es S = u 0 and
and = 1 if = 0.
For all in ‡ation rates, sellers target the buyers'reservation price u 0 . They do not let their price go beyond this target. This result is intuitive since a seller's expected sales fall to 0 if his price is above u 0 . Obviously, this particular form for the (S; s) rule hinges crucially on the linearity of buyers'utility function. 15 In the presence of in ‡ation, the opportunity cost of delaying the price adjustment is W s ( ) = 0 (in ‡ow terms), whereas the instantaneous bene…t
Therefore, the seller adjusts his price when his instantaneous utility falls to 0. 16 In the case of de ‡ation, the seller readjusts his price when it reaches the buyer's reservation price, u 0 , irrespective of his choice for s. The opportunity cost for the seller of delaying the price adjustment by setting a price smaller than s is equal to W s (0) = . From (7) there is a symmetry between in ‡ation and de ‡ation only when ! 0.
All through the paper, we focus on time-invariant cross-sectional distributions of real prices by assuming that real prices are log-uniformly distributed over [s; S]. As shown by Caplin and Spulberg (1987) and Benabou (1988) , the log-uniform distribution is the only one that is time invariant and consistent with the (s; S) rule. 17 Equivalently, the length of the period of time during which a seller's price has been kept unchanged is uniformly distributed on [0; ].
De…nition 1 An equilibrium is a pair (n; ) that satis…es (5) and (7) if 6 = 0 or (5) and
1 5 For alternative speci…cations for the utility function, the (S; s) rule would be such that the upper-bound S overshoots the ideal price of the seller. See, for instance, Benabou (1992) . We discuss the importance of this assumption at the end of the section. 1 6 One may wonder why the menu cost does not appear in Equation (7) when > 0. The reason is that the continuation value of a seller who readjusts his price is + W s (0). From the free-entry condition, this term is 0. Note, however, that the menu cost appears in the free-entry condition.
We illustrate the determination of equilibrium for the case > 0 in Figure 1 . The freeentry curve corresponds to (5), whereas the pricing curve corresponds to (7) . The pricing-curve slopes downward since sellers need to readjust their prices more frequently when the market is congested. The pricing-curve intersects the free-entry-curve when the latter reaches a maximum:
The number of sellers is highest when the frequency of price adjustment is chosen optimally.
As increases, the free-entry-curve shifts downward (see dotted curve), n decreases, and increases. In ‡ation drives sellers out of the market and raises (real) price dispersion. 18 Results are analogous when < 0. An increase in de ‡ation (a reduction in ) raises price dispersion and reduces the measures of sellers in the market. These results are summarized in the following proposition. We measure society's welfare as the expected surplus of buyers per unit of time.
Pricing Free entry
This welfare measure is legitimate since the free-entry condition drives sellers'expected utility to 0. Denote n 0 the measure of sellers when = 0.
The condition in Proposition 2 is similar to the one derived by Hosios (1990) for an e¢ cient allocation in the presence of congestion externalities. It states that the measure of sellers is socially e¢ cient if the fraction of the matches where sellers appropriate the whole surplus of a match coincides with sellers'contribution to the matching process as measured by the elasticity of the matching function. If 1 > 0 (n)n= (n), n is too high. Although it may not be well known, this is the main ine¢ ciency in the Diamond (1993) economy.
Proposition 3
Provided is su¢ ciently small, the optimal in ‡ation rate is strictly positive if
Proposition 3 indicates under which circumstances positive in ‡ation is desirable. An increase in in ‡ation has two opposite e¤ects on buyers'welfare. It raises the ability of buyers to extract a higher surplus, but it also reduces the number of sellers and therefore the frequency of trades.
If is low, the …rst e¤ect dominates and price dispersion raises buyers'welfare. In Diamond's (1993) economy, = 0 so the condition in Proposition 3 is satis…ed.
According to Proposition 1, in ‡ation and de ‡ation have similar e¤ects on price dispersion and the measure of sellers. It is therefore not obvious that optimal in ‡ation is positive when
The intuition for this result goes as follows. 19 If buyers could choose the in ‡ation rate, they would face a trade-o¤ between the larger share in the gains from trade that is associated with higher price dispersion and the lower frequency of trade that is associated with the smaller number of sellers in the market. For a given price dispersion j j, 1 9 This result explains the numerical example provided by Diamond and Felli (1992) .
in ‡ation hurts sellers less than de ‡ation does. Indeed, if > 0, sellers set their prices to S and get high pro…ts at the beginning of the (S; s) cycle, whereas if < 0, they set their prices to s and get low pro…ts …rst. Therefore, it is optimal to reduce sellers'market power by running a positive in ‡ation instead of a de ‡ation.
Monetary economies
We now introduce a transaction role for money by assuming that buyers are anonymous in the centralized market and cannot commit to repay their debts. In the absence of credit arrangements, trades in bilateral matches need to be quid pro quo, and this requires buyers hold money balances. The price of general goods in terms of money is now endogenous. We will determine the optimal monetary policy in the absence of menu costs, and we will investigate how the presence of nominal frictions a¤ects policy.
The quantity of …at money per buyer is M (t) > 0. The growth rate of the money supply is constant over time and equal to ; that is, _ M = M . Money is injected (withdrawn if < 0) by lump-sum transfers (taxes). For simplicity, transfers go only to buyers. We will restrict our attention to steady-state equilibria in which the real value of money M=w is constant over time, i.e., _ w = w.
Let W b (z) be the value of an unmatched buyer holding z units of real money (expressed in terms of the general good). The stochastic time for a buyer to …nd a seller, denoted T b , is characterized by an exponential distribution with mean 1= . The value function W b (z) satis…es
where x(t) is the net consumption ‡ow of general goods at time t, where V b (z) is the value function of a matched buyer holding z units of real money, and where the trajectory fx(t); z(t)g is contingent on t < T b . 20 The …rst term on the right-hand side of (9) is the utility of consumption minus the disutility of production over the time interval [0; T b ]. The second term is the present value of being matched at time T b with z(T b ) units of real money. Equation (10) is a budget identity. The term L on the right-hand side is a lump-sum transfer expressed in terms 2 0 Implicitly, we allow for jumps in the state variables. For a presentation of optimal control problems with jumps in state variables, see Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987, chapter 3) . of the general good, and the last term re ‡ects the fact that real balances depreciate at rate . 21 The initial condition for real balances is given by (11) .
From the assumption that T b is exponentially distributed, (9) can be rewritten
subject to (10) and (11). 22 Interestingly, (12) is analogous to a deterministic optimal control problem in which the e¤ective discount rate is + (n) and the instantaneous utility is x + (n)V b (z).
Lemma 2 Assume V b (z) is concave. Buyers adjust their real balances instantly to aẑ that
The left-hand side of (13) is the bene…t for the buyer of an additional unit of real balances, whereas the right-hand side is the marginal cost of real balances. This cost, measured in terms of the general good, is the sum of the forgone unit of the general good and the cost of holding real balances, as measured by the sum of the discount rate and the in ‡ation rate, over a period of time of length 1= (n). Assuming V b (z) is strictly concave over a relevant range, the solution to (13) is unique and the steady-state distribution of real balances across buyers is degenerate at z =ẑ. 23 Given that the buyer adjusts his real balances toẑ instantly, we have
The value function of a matched buyer satis…es
2 1 Let m be the buyer's nominal balances. Then, z = m=w and _ z = ( _ w=w)(m=w) + _ m=w. To obtain (10), use the fact that _ w=w = and _ m=w = x + L. 2 2 See the Appendix for a derivation of (12). 2 3 If V b (z) is linear over the relevant range for the choice of z, we restrict ourselves to symmetric equilibria. This will be the case for > 0 and close to .
where q s depends on both the buyer's real balances and the real price p posted by the seller.
With probability , the buyer has the ability to make an o¤er (q b ; d b ). He enjoys the utility of consumption u 0 q b and becomes unmatched with z d b units of real balances. With probability 1 , the buyer trades at the posted price p and consumes q s units of goods for pq s units of real balances, where q s is determined as before. Using the linearity of W b (z), (14) can be rewritten
The seller's value function obeys the Bellman equation (2), where G is now a function of F (z), the distribution of real balances across buyers,
Let us turn to the determination of prices. In the fraction of the matches where the buyer has the ability to make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er, he proposes (
The main di¤erence with respect to the previous section is that the transfer d b is constrained by the buyer's (monetary) wealth. The solution to (17) is
According to (18) , if z > z , then d b z is not binding and agents trade the e¢ cient quantity q . If z < z , then the constraint binds and the buyer spends all his real balances to buy less than q . In the fraction 1 of the matches where agents trade at the posted price, the buyer demands z=p if u 0 p and 0 otherwise, and sellers are willing to produce up to q such that c 0 ( q) = p. Therefore,
Flexible prices
The case where prices can be adjusted at no cost ( = 0) will allow us to contrast the monetary economy with the economy described in the previous section. 24 In particular, we will show that even though in ‡ation drives sellers out of the market, as in the cashless economy with sticky prices, this e¤ect is not welfare-enhancing in the monetary economy with ‡exible prices.
When prices can be adjusted at no cost, the sellers'optimal pricing strategy is p = u 0 for any distribution of real balances F (z). The reasoning is similar to the one in Lemma 1. If buyers choose p > u 0 , they make no trade, and sellers have no incentive to choose a price lower than u 0 since for all p u 0 buyers spend all their real balances. This pricing strategy allows sellers to extract all the surplus of a match whenever agents trade at the posted price. From (15), the Bellman equation for the value function of a buyer can be simpli…ed to
Equation ( which is worth 1 in terms of utility. From (20) , V b zz < 0 for all z < z . From Lemma 2, there is a unique solutionẑ < z to (13) , and the distribution of real balances across buyers is degenerate. 25 Furthermore, (13) and (20) yield: 2 4 This model is related to the search equilibrium described in Rocheteau and Wright (2005) . 2 5 To check that z < z , note …rst that V Free entry of sellers implies W s (0) = 0, which gives from (2)
De…nition 2 A monetary equilibrium with ‡exible prices is a list (z; n) that satis…es (21) and (22) .
Assume > (We will treat the case = separately). We cannot rule out multiplicity of steady-state equilibria. When such multiplicity arises, we focus on the equilibrium with the highest values for q and n as it converges to an equilibrium at the Friedman rule. According to Proposition 5, the monetary equilibrium is ine¢ cient since the quantities traded in matches where agents trade at the posted price are always ine¢ ciently low, even at the limit when approaches . This monopolistic competition ine¢ ciency is related to the fact that sellers do not internalize the e¤ects of their pricing decisions on buyers' real balances. 26 Even if the quantities traded in bilateral matches were e¢ cient, the entry of sellers would generically be ine¢ cient because of the presence of search externalities.
Let us turn to the case = . Denote n the value of n that satis…es (22) when q s = q .
Proposition 6 If = then any (z; n) such that z 2 [c(q ); u 0 q ] and n satis…es (22) is an equilibrium. Equilibria are strictly positively Pareto-ranked according to z. There is an equilibrium that generates the …rst-best allocation i¤ = 1 (n ).
From the previous proposition, there is a real indeterminacy at the Friedman rule. There exists a continuum of equilibria and these equilibria are Pareto-ranked. Intuitively, when + = 0 there is no cost of holding real balances so that buyers are indi¤erent between any level of real balances above c(q ). However, an increase in real balances above c(q ) allows sellers to extract a higher surplus in matches where buyers trade at the posted price. If one selects the equilibrium by taking the limit ! , this equilibrium corresponds to the one with the lowest welfare, i.e., the one with the lowest real balances.
Calibration We calibrate this model using the methodology in Lucas (2000). A unit of time corresponds to a year and r = 0:03. We de…ne B as the aggregate output in the centralized market. 27 The functional forms for the disutility of production is c(q) = q +1 =( +1). We adopt the normalization u 0 = 1. 
; 2 6 This ine¢ ciency should be distinguished from the bargaining ine¢ ciency based on the nonmonotonicity of the generalized Nash solution in Lagos and Wright (2005) . 2 7 It is indeterminate in the model because of the linearity of the utility function. The only requirement imposed by the model is B (n)z. We introduce this parameter to pin down the relative size of the decentralized market and to make the calibration as close as possible to the one in Lagos and Wright (2005) .
where the pair (z; n) solves (21) and (22) . Hence L is a function of i = r + . Following Lucas (2000), i is taken to be the commercial paper rate and let M be M 1. The sample period is 1900-2000.
The matching technology takes the following functional form: (n) = n where 2 (0; 1).
Since there are no study on the matching technology in goods market and the best …t for money demand is obtained for small values of we pick = 0:1. We choose k to generate the same frequency of trade as in Lagos and Wright (2005) , that is (n) = 0:5, at = 2%. 28 Finally, the parameter is chosen so as to generate an average markup of 10% when = 2%, i.e.,
The markup in the centralized market is 1. In the decentralized market, the markup is z=q b c 0 (q b )
if the buyer makes the o¤er and z=q s c 0 (q s ) otherwise. The parameter values for our benchmark example are recapitulated in Table 1 . We measure welfare as buyer's expected utility in the decentralized market plus the net consumption of buyers and sellers in the centralized market (which is 0 by de…nition of the utility function). We omit sellers'expected utility in the decentralized market since it is 0 from the free-entry condition. Welfare is then
where (n ; q b ) are the equilibrium values of n and q b when the in ‡ation rate is . Suppose next that the in ‡ation rate is set at = 0 but total consumption is reduced by a factor 1 (where will be our measure of the welfare cost of in ‡ation). Society's welfare is then
where the last term is the reduction in consumption in the centralized market. The welfare cost of an in ‡ation rate is the fraction of total consumption that agents would be willing to give up to be in a steady state with no in ‡ation instead of a steady state with in ‡ation ,
i.e., solves (2005) arises from the fact that the participation of sellers is endogenous in our model. An increase of the in ‡ation rate reduces the ine¢ ciently large measure of sellers which mitigates the negative e¤ect of in ‡ation on real balances.
Sticky prices
Assume now that sellers must incur a …xed cost to change prices. As in the previous section, we focus on steady-state equilibria in which the distribution of (real) prices, H(p); is time-invariant and price adjustments are uniformly staggered. The seller's value function obeys a ‡ow Bellman equation analogous to condition (2) , but where G is given by (16) . The pricing policy of sellers is still given by Lemma 1.
We describe the buyer's choice of real balances in the case where the growth rate of the money supply is positive ( > 0). If a buyer meets a seller at random, the price posted by the seller is p(h) = u 0 e h , where h is uniformly distributed over [0; ]. The quantity q s satis…es
whereh is the value of h such that c 0 (q s ) = p(h); i.e., ze h = u 0 c 0 1 u 0 e h . The seller serves all the buyer's demand if p(h) p(h) ; otherwise, the buyer is rationed. From (15) and (19), the expected utility of a matched buyer can be rewritten as 29
Let us interpret the second term on the right-hand side of (23) . If h <h, the seller satis…es all the buyer's demand and the buyer's surplus is equal to (u 0 p)q s = z
Therefore, the buyer can extract a positive surplus even when trading at the posted price. The third term on the right-hand side has a similar interpretation.
where [x] + = max(x; 0). If the buyer can make a take-it-or-leave-it-o¤er, one additional unit of real balances allows him to raise his utility by
. If the buyer trades at the posted price, p(h) = u 0 e h , and assuming that the seller satis…es all his demand, an additional unit of real balances allows him to buy e h =u 0 units of the special good which is worth e h in terms of utility. 2 9 To obtain (23), we use the fact that for all h <h, (u 0 p ) qs = ze h z, whereas for all h >h, (u
From (24), V b (z) is concave, and strictly concave for all z < z and for all z such that h(z) < . From (13) and (24),
In ‡ation has two opposite e¤ects on the value of money. It raises the opportunity cost of holding cash, the left-hand side of (25), and it transfers some market power to the buyer, the second term on right-hand side of (25) . The second e¤ect is absent from the model with ‡exible prices.
The buyer's choice of real balances in the case of de ‡ation ( < 0) is derived using similar reasoning,
whereh(z) satis…es ze
De…nition 3 A steady-state monetary equilibrium with menu cost is a list (z; n; ) that satis…es (5), (7) 
Calibrated examples
The model with endogenous real balances and state-dependent pricing is hard to study analytically. Therefore, we conduct our analysis through numerical examples. We use the same parameter values as in Table 1 . We choose the menu cost so that prices are adjusted once a year at = 2% ( = 0:536). In Figure 2 the panels on the left (right) plot the endogenous variables for negative (positive) in ‡ation rates.
In presence of menu costs and positive in ‡ation (top right panel of Figure 2 ), z is a decreasing function of . As outlined in (25) , in ‡ation raises the cost of holding real balances, but it also allows buyers to extract a larger share of the gains from trade. For our parametrization, the …rst e¤ect dominates. 30 Real balances are higher in the presence of menu costs since the second e¤ect of in ‡ation is absent from the model with ‡exible prices.
Consider next the case of negative money growth rates (top left panel of Figure 2 ). An increase in the de ‡ation rate reduces the cost of holding real balances and it raises buyers' average share in the gains from trade. As a consequence, z increases. The relationship between z and exhibits an in ‡ection point when z is in the neighborhood of z . This result can be explained as follows. At z = z , <h so that buyers are never rationed. When the in ‡ation rate falls below the value that generates z , buyers increase their real balances until they get rationed in some matches: z increases to the value that satis…esh(z) = . Also, the presence of nominal frictions eliminates the real indeterminacy at the Friedman rule: as tends to , z approaches u 0 q .
Let us turn to the e¤ects of in ‡ation on the frequency of trades -See the two panels on the second row of Figure 2 . In ‡ation reduces sellers'incentives to enter the market since they have to readjust prices more frequently. Hence, (n) decreases with . De ‡ation has two e¤ects on the measure of sellers. On the one hand buyers carry more real balances which gives sellers higher incentives to enter the market. On the other hand a higher de ‡ation rate implies that sellers need to readjust their prices more often. For low de ‡ation rates, the …rst e¤ect dominates while when gets closer to the Friedman rule, the second e¤ect dominates.
The e¤ects of in ‡ation on the length of the (S; s) cycle are in accordance with those obtained in cashless economies (See the bottom panels of Figure 2 ). As in ‡ation increases, sellers need to readjust their prices more often (but price dispersion increases). A stronger e¤ect occurs when one reduces below 0. For our example, the welfare gain of reducing from 0 to the Friedman rule is about 0.7% of total consumption. So, de ‡ationary policies dominate in ‡ationary ones. This result is robust across the various numerical examples we have considered provided menu costs are not (unreasonably) large.
To summarize, the presence of nominal rigidities can explain why a small positive in ‡ation rate generates a higher welfare than price stability. However, when looking at the optimal monetary policy, de ‡ation does better than in ‡ation (subject to the caveat that menu costs are not too large). This contrasts with our result for cashless economies. 
Optimality of the Friedman rule
Close to the Friedman rule, the economy behaves similarly to the cashless economy described in Section 3. The number of sellers decreases as decreases (equivalently, the de ‡ation rate increases) because of the negative e¤ect of price dispersion on sellers' expected utility. If the number of sellers is ine¢ ciently high at the Friedman rule -which is the case in our calibrated example-then the Friedman rule is optimal since an increase of the in ‡ation rate would make the number of sellers even higher. The case where there are too many sellers because of congestion externalities corresponds to low values of relative to (1 )=(1 + ) -See Proposition 3.
In Figure 4 , we provide numerical examples where the Friedman rule is not optimal. Con- rule can be optimal because an increase in in ‡ation raises the entry of sellers. In contrast, when = 0:25 the measure of sellers is too large at the Friedman rule so that increasing in ‡ation would reduce welfare. For this parametrization we found that the threshold for above which the Friedman rule is no longer optimal is slightly above 1=3, the threshold for above which a deviation from price stability is suboptimal in cashless economies. So the extent of search externalities matters in cashless economies to explain the optimality of price stability while it matters in monetary economies to explain the optimality of the Friedman rule. Figure 5 illustrates how the size of menu costs a¤ects real balances and the frequency of trade.
The e¤ects of menu costs
The parameter values are the same as in Table 1 except for . According to the top panels of Figure 5 a larger menu cost raises real balances by increasing the buyer's (expected) share in the match surplus. Also, for positive in ‡ation rates the curve for real balances is hump-shaped. A small increase in in ‡ation can increase real balances. The medium-left panel of Figure 5 shows that the measure of dealers increases with in ‡ation close to the Friedman rule and this e¤ect is ampli…ed for large menu costs. By de ‡ating at a higher rate the monetary authority reduces sellers'market power (they have to readjust prices more often) and it drives sellers out. On the contrary, for positive in ‡ation rates the frequency of trade increases with the size of the menu cost since buyers'real balances are higher. Finally, and not surprisingly, the bottom panels of Figure 5 reveals that sellers readjust prices less frequently when menu costs are larger. 
Discussion
We studied optimal monetary policy in environments with search and nominal frictions. We showed that search frictions generate a congestion externality in the goods market that can rationalize a role for positive in ‡ation in cashless economies and a role for a deviation from the Friedman rule in monetary economies. In the presence of menu costs, in ‡ation erodes sellers' market power by preventing them from maintaining a monopoly price. This e¤ect can be bene…cial to society when sellers do not internalize the congestion they impose on other sellers.
In monetary economies, however, a monetary wedge associated with a positive nominal interest rate makes de ‡ation optimal. A deviation from the Friedman rule is optimal when sellers have relatively low market power. Our results are summarized in Table 3 . Without entry the Friedman rule would always optimal.
Flexible prices Sticky prices
No monetary wedge is neutral = 0 if high > 0 if low To conclude, we discuss the robustness of our results to alternative assumptions. The main result of Section 3, according to which the optimal in ‡ation can be strictly positive in the presence of search frictions, was derived under a linear utility function. As a consequence, S is equal to the seller's ideal price, i.e., the one he would choose if = 0. For strictly concave utility functions, the upper-bound S can be larger than the seller's ideal price. The positive welfare e¤ect of in ‡ation in our model relies on the congestion externality that prevails in the goods market. In ‡ation in the presence of menu costs drives sellers out of the market, which raises welfare when the congestion is too severe. We conjecture that in ‡ation will reduce sellers' expected pro…ts by preventing them from setting a monopoly price irrespective of the speci…c form taken by the (S; s) rule.
In our description of the monetary economy, all trades in the decentralized market are conducted with money. Alternatively, one could assume that only a fraction of trades involve monetary exchange, while the remaining trades use credit (say, because agents have access to a record-keeping technology with some probability). As the fraction of monetary trades goes to 0, the economy approaches the cashless economy described in Section 3. We conjecture that the optimal in ‡ation would depend on the extent of monetary exchange in the decentralized market and that it could be positive provided that the share of monetary trades is su¢ ciently small.
As emphasized above, our welfare results rely heavily on the search externalities associated with sellers' participation decisions. While we have assumed a free entry of sellers as in Diamond (1993) Di¤erentiate (29) with respect to h to obtain
A2. Proof of Lemma 1.
We prove Lemma 1 for the case where buyers hold real balances z and cannot use credit.
The distribution of real balances across buyers is F (z).
Case 1: = 0. The seller chooses p in order to maximize
where 1 fp u 0 g is an indicator function that is equal to 1 if p u 0 and 0 otherwise. According to (30) , in each match the seller chooses the quantity q to produce, subject to the constraint that q is not greater than the buyer's demand. If p > u 0 the buyer's demand is 0, and if p u 0 then the buyer's demand is z=p. Denote (z) the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to pq z.
The seller's problem can be rewritten as
Assume p u 0 so that 1 fp u 0 g = 1. The …rst-order condition for q(z) is
Di¤erentiate G(p) and use (32) to obtain
Therefore, the optimal price is p = u 0 .
Case 2: > 0 and > 0. First, we show S = u 0 using a proof by contradiction. Assume that the optimal (S; s) rule is such that S > u 0 . Using the fact that G(p) = 0 for all p > u 0 , (4) yields
The …rst term on the right-hand side corresponds to the interval of time during which the seller's price is above u 0 . Since this term is negative, we have
which can be re-expressed as
Since e ln(S=u 0 ) < 1 we have
Adopt the change of variablet = t ln(S=u 0 ) to rewrite the previous inequality as
Consequently, a pro…table deviation is to set S = u 0 while keeping s unchanged. Therefore, S > u 0 is not optimal. Consider next a (S; s) rule such that S < u 0 . Since G(Se t ) is increasing in S, it can be checked from (4) that for given , W s (0) is a strictly increasing function of S for all S u 0 . Consequently, S < u 0 is not optimal. Second, to determine the optimal length of the (S; s) cycle, di¤erentiate the right-hand side of (4) with respect to to obtain (7).
Case 3: > 0 and < 0. The reasoning for S = u 0 is similar to the one for the case > 0.
To determine the optimal , express W s (0) as
Di¤erentiate (34) with respect to and use the fact that W s (0) = to obtain (7).
A3. Proof of Proposition 1
We consider three cases.
Case 1: = 0. The seller sets p = u 0 and = 1. From (5),
where G(u 0 ) = (1 ) [u 0 q c(q )] > 0. Since (n)=n is continuous and strictly decreasing, lim n!0 (n)=n = 1 and lim n!1 (n)=n = 0, there exists a unique n that satis…es (35) and it is such that @n=@ = 0.
Case 2: > 0 and > 0. Using p(t) = u 0 e t , Equations (5) and (7) yield
where
and G(p) = 0 otherwise. Let n f be the value of n that satis…es (35). The left-hand side of (36) tends to 1 as n approaches 0, and it is equal to 0 for all n n f . Furthermore, for all n 2 0; n f , the left-hand side of (36) is strictly decreasing in n. Consequently, there exists a unique n 2 0; n f that satis…es (36). Given n, price dispersion is determined by (7) . Totally di¤erentiate (36) to obtain
where (n) = 0 (n)n= (n). From (7), @ =@ > 0.
Case 3: > 0 and < 0. Using the fact that p(t) = u 0 e ( t) , (5) and (7) can be rewritten
Following the reasoning of Case 2, it is easy to show that there exists a unique n 2 0; n f that satis…es (37). Furthermore, @n=@ > 0 and @ j j =@ < 0.
A4. Proof of Proposition 2.
In the case = 0, W = W b = (n)[u(q) c(q)] kn. The e¢ cient value for n satis…es 0 (n) [u 0 q c(q )] = k, whereas the equilibrium value for n satis…es (n)(1 ) [u 0 q c(q )] = nk. The two coincide i¤ 0 (n)n= (n) = 1 .
A5. Proof of Proposition 3
We …rst show that an increase in in ‡ation above price stability is optimal when <
The welfare metric is
Di¤erentiate and take the limit as ! 0 to obtain
where the relationship between n and is given by (7), i.e.,
From (39),
Substitute dn=d by its expression given by (40) into (38) to get In order to show that the optimal in ‡ation rate is not negative, we use a proof by contradiction. Assume the optimal in ‡ation rate is < 0. Let~ be the positive in ‡ation rate such that price dispersion j j at =~ is equal to price dispersion at = . From (7) the measure of sellers satis…es n(~ ) > n( ). Therefore, from (8), W b (~ ) > W b ( ). A contradiction.
A6. Derivation of (12)
Since T b is exponentially distributed, the maximand on the right-hand side of (9) 
Interchange the order of integration in the repeated integral to get 
Assuming an interior solution for z, the necessary conditions from Pontryagin's maximum principle are
where V b z is the derivative of the value function V b (z). We add the following transversality condition from the Mangasarian su¢ ciency theorem 
To get (13) , combine (45) and (46). Assuming V b (z) is concave, the Hamiltonian H(x; z; ) is jointly concave in (x; z). Since the transversality condition is satis…ed for the solution given by (45) and (46), it is a maximum. Furthermore, (10) implies _ = 0 and z satis…es (13) . The uniqueness of the solution to (13) follows from the strict concavity of V b (z). Note that the state variable z jumps to the solution of (13) 
with q(0; ) = 0 and q (1; ) = q . Furthermore, q (n; ) is strictly increasing in n and strictly decreasing in . Using (48), equilibrium condition (22) can be reformulated as (n; ) = 0 with (n; ) (1 ) (n) n c [q (n; )] c c [q (n; )] u 0 k:
We …rst show that under the Friedman rule ( = ) a monetary equilibrium always exists.
From (48), q (n; ) = q for all n > 0. Therefore, given that c(q ) < u 0 q , (0; ) = 1 and (1; ) = k. Consequently, if = there exists a n > 0 that satis…es (n; ) = 0.
Consider next > . For all > , (1; ) = k. For all n > 0, (n; ) is continuous and decreasing in . Using the continuity of (n; ) one can deduce that there is a threshold > such that for all 2 ( ; ) there exists n > 0 such that (n; ) = 0.
Finally, let us show that @z=@ < 0 and @n=@ < 0 at the equilibrium with the highest z.
Equations (21) and (22) give two positive relationships between z and n. Furthermore, at the equilibrium with the highest z the curve (21) cuts the curve (22) by below in the space (z; n).
An increase in moves the curve (21) upward leading to a decrease of both z and n.
A9. Proof of Proposition 5
The two measures of welfare W and W b are the same in the ‡exible price economy,
From (22) and (50), social welfare in equilibrium reduces to W = (n) [u 0 q c(q)]. Given that an increase in reduces both q and n, the optimal monetary policy is the Friedman rule.
Let us turn to the second part of the proposition. 
A10. Proof of Proposition 6
From ( [n(z)] fu 0 q c(q )g where n(z) is the value of n that satis…es (22) . Since n(z) is strictly increasing in z, buyer's welfare is strictly increasing in z so that equilibria with higher values for z Pareto-dominate equilibria with lower values for z. The …rst-best allocation is such that q b = q s = q and n satis…es 0 (n)[u 0 q c(q )] = k. From (18) and (19) this requires z = u 0 q , and from (22),
